In the southern states of Tennessee and Georgia, Whig strongholds in the 1840 legislative election, voter support for annexation unrest in the Deep South skyrocketed — and Clay lost any deep south state in polk. [143] The Northern Whigs` intransigent hostility to the expansion of slavery increasingly marked the party, and southern members had suffered, by association, from the southern Democrats` accusation of being «soft with Texas, that is, soft with slavery.» [144] Following the 1845 congressional and g-governor elections in their home countries, a number of Southern Whigs attempted to eliminate this impression regarding the Tyler Texas Act. [145] [146] As a contractual document with a foreign nation, the Tyler-Texas annexation contract required the support of a two-thirds majority in the Senate for its passage. Congress postponed before debating the issue. [127] This «safety valve» theory «appealed to the racial fears of whites in the North,» who feared the prospect of welcoming emancipated slaves into their communities if the institution of slavery collapsed in the South. [91] This scheme of racial cleansing was pragmatically consistent with the overseas black colonization proposals, followed by a number of American presidents, from Jefferson to Lincoln. [92] Walker confirmed his position by blaming national security concerns and warning that in the event of a failed annexation, Britain would lead the Republic of Texas to emancipate its slaves and predicted dangerous destabilizing influence on the slave states of the Southwest. . .

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